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Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield 
CUR DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
With the truce in Korea and the inconclusive results of the Berlin 
Conference, another chapter in the book of ldstory must be considered. (The 
future of the United States of America depends on the maintenance of a sound mili-
tary policy, keyed to the dangers of the atomic age and at the same time tied to 
the economic and political framework of our capitalistic system. There is no 
cheap, no easy nor sure solution to the difficulties which confront us in this day 
and age. There is r.o single possible weapon which will automatically win wars or 
by its very destructiveness prevent them. The age in which we live calls for 
clearer thinking, facing up to realities and sound decisions. This period calls for 
steadiness in our for e5.gn pdicy and continuity in our military strength. The age 
in which ,, e liv~ pos .: _. ior t. s the ~ossib.i.lity that wars may be recurrent and until 
a peaceful and secu.x ~ world is achieved, we must, in my opinion, always operate 
on that assumption. j 
I real.~. : e fu:l well ~:.at ~he ideaHsts among us thir1k that a better way of 
life can be acl:ieved for all people to the end that wa1·s will be abandoned forever. 
I wish that I could hold to this ideal. I pray that it can come true but as a matter 
of practical necessity, I am afraid that long-sought-for day is beyond the period 
of our immediate historical future. In line with our responsibilities, we can no 
longer afford to keep our guard-- that is, our defenses -- down. As the leading 
nation among the free countries of the world, we must assume the burden of 
leadership if the peoples in the area are to retain any degree of the freedom 
which they now enjoy. We cannot afford ups and downs in either our military or 
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foreign policy and we sho uld recognize the fact the s e freedoms which we enjoy 
were paid fo r with our blood and our treasure. We must realize further that if 
we are to retain these freedoms, which too many of us accept c omplacently, that 
we must be prepared to pay and if nee d be, to fight fo r their retention. 
In the present world there are two great powers b e hind which, to a 
greater o r lesser degree, the rest of the world is aligned, T)lo se powers as the 
iV"" C ~•I ""' . I 
world well knows are the /United- Stat~s of America and the ~ion c £ the Soviet 
Socialist R.epuhlic. The tactical changes in Russian policy do not mean that we 
can afford to shore up our defenses, bring the boys home and lapse into a period 
which used to be called " no rmalcy". 
The Soviet's idea to bring America to its knees is two -fold; one, to 
weaken our economy to such an extent that we will have a depression at horne. 
Two, to cause a split between our allies and ourselves. Honeyed words by the 
Soviets should not lull us into a sense of false security because unless these words 
are transformed into deeds, and ~ntil these deeds prove what they mean, there 
can be no let-up in the deep seated friction which exists between the bee and 
slave world. Americans would be fooliah to think that tae skies above and the 
oceans on both sides furnish us with a really protective barrier. We know that 
we are very vulnerable and becoming more so each day as space-devouring, 
ocean-spanning aircraft and missiles, submarines that can cro as the oceans sub-
merged and atomic weapons are developed. The fact that other frontiers are 
vulnerable does not mean any less secuTity for the vulnerability of our own outer 
life lines. The possibility of a seriously crippling attack against the shores of 
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the United States is something we must remember at all times and on that basis 
we must do all we can to bring about, if possible, awareness of the danger such 
an attack might inflate. 
According to our best info rmed scientists, we have about a three-year 
lead in the ato mic arms race in relation to the Soviet Union. We know there have 
been three atomic de_l=: ::J...7.~ We know that the United States has 
detonated at leastlt.'J)..!.weapons of all types from city-busters to atomic shells 
fired by cannon. In November, 1952 fo r the first time a hydro gen device blew an 
hland off the map of the Pacific, created a tremendous crater in the bottom of 
the ocean of sufficient capacity to comfortably accommodate 14 Pentagon buildings, 
and released the equivalent in power of More than five million tons of TNT as 
compared to the 15, 000 - 20, 000-ton bomb of Hiroshima and the 20, 000- ton bomb 
),.J ~~+-lt,tfi~-'+ ~~ ~ _.,~ ~ (XJ f'<J.-.4.+-..;--
of Nagasaki. 1'1 In Wo rld War U A m erican Air Force planes all over the world~ 
~ ~ -,:...,..:..._ c.--
dropped only two million tons of bo mbs; today 100 B-50 airplanes wi th one ~
'-'t,c... · 
Nagasaki type bomb each wo uld equal that amount. In other words, the hydrogen IJ;:::.-
bomb is to the atomic bomb as the atomic bom b is to TNT. We are now definitely ,..,......,. 
in the hydrogen age and all the armed services of the United States are now 
beginning to receive production versions of guided missiles and are also continu-
ing to develop still furthe r the te rrible German nerve gases, developed in World...., 
War II, to even more toxic gases . This technolo gical revolution in weapons has 
decreased, no t increased, o ur security and this factor shol!ld be fully understood ~ 
~ · 
by all of us. In practically every field of technolo gical research in the weapons 
of destruction, we must assume, and I think rightly s o , that the Soviet Union is 1~ r\ 
(l-
1.. k n. lf. /c4.e.JJ --~ ) ft'l l~'f -y. "1 0 {'('~~~ 
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moving along parallel paths. The Soviet Union today has, it has been estimated, 
a stockpile of between 100-175 atomic weapons. In the opinion of certain high 
rank:ng officials of the United States Air Force, she will have enough a~omic 
weapons by mid- 1954 to sustain an atomic offensive against the United States and 
ou:.- allies and the planes to carry the bombs . Our atomic advan~age in quantity 
and quality of weapons will not be of much comfort to us if and when such a time 
comes, but neither will it be too much of an advantage to an aggressor because 
the aggressor knows that the retaliation ""ill be terrible and in k:.nd. 
In the matter of hydrogen bombs, we might just as wel'!. face up to the 
fact that the P.ussians have their scientists working on the problem and that its 
development will be somewhat parallel to ours. In addition, it is reasonable to 
assume that both the Soviet Union and the free world are working on what is known 
't. 
as the "cobalt" bomb . ,._ This advance over the hydrogen missile could be made by 
X.. f... 
"seeding" atom and hydrogen bombs with cobalt." I~mLt stand the resuTiing 
.ra.di&tion would ba aa .deadly tha i worud destl"6y frtcmd anQ Loe ali.J~e. 'v7e can 
see therefore that Russia in the final analyois is not getting weaker but is, in fact, 
getting stronger all the time. Their tactics may be changed temporarily but not 
thei:!: st:.-ategy. Their ultimate goal is still the same, security for the Soviet 
Union ~,!1.,5!_ world conquest. These two objectives can and should be viewed as 
mutually supporting and identical. 
Turning to the economy of our country we can see that even he:.-e we are 
entering a period of danger. In the past few years the UnHed States has changed 
from "bav.e" to a "have not" nation . For the first time in our history, we are 
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importing more than 50o/o of our raw materials from sources outside of our own -
frontiers. This fact should be borne in mind for a better understanding of the 
foreign policy of the United States and which should bring home to all of us the 
continuing need which we will have on other nations as sources of supply for 
these raw strategic materials. The present administration has, and I believe 
?. rightly, abandoned the "crisis year" philosPphy of the previous administration 
and prepared, instead, not for any definite date of danger but for an indefinite 
continuation of danger. 
Because of the reasons enumerated, we should ::."ccognize that we face 
far greater difficulties in the future than we have in the past. We have strength 
today and that strength must be maintained. We are far better prepared at this 
moment than we were prior to any of the wars in which this country has been 
engaged. Our Navy is the strongest in the world. It is larger than all the rest 
of the world's fleets put together even though 50 of its ships are to be put in 
mothballs under the "new look". We are operating a total of 25 - 30 aircraft 
carriers of all types and we maintain - for the time being at least - an 
a mphibious lift in commission for two divisions. We arc fairly well-prepared 
against any threat by submarine. Of the some 400 Soviet submadnes possibly 
ten are o f the modern snorkel long-range type; another 75-100 are conventional 
ocean-going types; all the rest are small coastal submarines or old medium -
range vessels. The United States has more long-range ocean - going submarines 
than the Russians and our defenses against submarine attacks are by no means 
weak. 
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On the question of air power, we are not weaker in number though we 
may be behind temporarily in the number of modern tactical types. The Navy 
and the Marine Corps has an inventory of about 13,000 planes of all military 
types (including trainers); the Air Force has about 21, 000 which, under fiscal 
1955 budget plans will be increased to 22, 000 by mid-1955. We are stronger 
than the Soviet Union in long-range land-based bombers and in naval planes both 
carrier-based and patrol - type. The Soviets have g:-eater strength than we do in 
land-based tactical types for support of ground armies, interception, and day-
fighter missions. 
The Air Force has activated more than 100 groups - - numbering from 
30 to 75 planes each - - but probably no more than 85 of these groups are fully 
ope:-ational at this time . Our air power is in transition from propeller - driven. 
slow- speed types to jet- power ed transonic and supersonic types with only one-
fourth of current Air For ce Hying time in jets. In the latter field the Russians 
appear at the moment to be at least equal to, possibly superior to us. 
The aircraft production of the two <..ountries is probably about the same 
with the yearly outcome averaging between 12,000 - 14, 000 military types. One 
dif.Le:-ence thou~h . and it is an important one, is that we arc producing more 
planes in te r ms of a i rframe weight which means more of our output rep:-esents 
heavy complicated jet bombers. Our greatest apparent disadvantage is on land . 
The Marines have 3 divisions and the Army maintains 20 divisions plus 18 regi-
l2.l.a-L--~ , .. t'+i~ ~~ . .,_ 
mental combat team~ Of the At·my divisions, six - with two being recalled 
and one Mar ine division a r e in Korea; two. plus one Marine division. a r e in 
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Japan; five in Europe; seven in the United States -- plus numerous regimental 
comba~ teams ... md other smaller units here and .libroc.d. Cf the seven divisions 
in thz Pnited Scates, six are weak -- below strength -- and none rea.:iy for combat 
except the 82d Airborne Division. ~ f;;t,./ ~ ~ ~,p.,~ ~ 
fl. "( 
The Russi<.:~::; on the other hand maintu.i;.~ ~ ::.:s.cic framework of 175 
divisions though most of them are not at full stren~th. On the basis of combat 
effectiveness, which includes mobility, fixe power, etc., it is estimated that the 
175 Rl'Seian divisions would approximat~ly equal no more ~han 70 - 90 American-
type divisio:1s. The Soviet'c advantage of lc:.nd power is very great, particularly 
since the f us.:;!c:.ns could mobi:ize from 100 - 300 additional divisions in 90 cays, 
wl.e-·eas the Unite~ States reserve strength is in no sease organized, t:;:ain~~. or 
equ:.pp'!..:. .:o r combat without a long prepaJ.•atory period after wa;: starts. Further-
mo:-e, ai.~~1ough the strength of the Soviet Army is p;:actically the same as it was 
at the end o~ World War !I-- 175 diviaions, numb:.J:-:!ng approximately 4 million 
-- tile f .... ct is tl:at ai.most all the Soviet d:.visions have been thorou!;hly modernized, 
mechanized and b;:ought hp to date. Cn the basis o! what I have said, it is 
appa:-ent that at t~'le momen~ the Sovbt tT::1ion has a greater advantage on land. 
Th:.s, therc:ore , must be compe"lsated for by a con~:.nuing Amerj,can advantage 
in <·he a:.r and at sea -- an advantage which we hold today and w:~ica we rr.•.:s~. in 
m! ct-inion, ac~elerate to a greater <.legree in the ai~. C u,.· air strength is not 
suf~icien~ to win c:.:r superio·. ity over We s~ern Europe or Nor~heast A sic:.. We 
are fortunate t!lo ugh in havir.g some high-;.y :..ndustrialized nations among ou4• 
alLes in NATO , allies actually of potentia1 strength in air power whereas in 
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contrast, the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain are chiefly dependent on 
Soviet factories for their aircraft and equipment . British design is abreast, or, 
in some respects, ahead of the world, particularly in fighter types and in medium 
or short-range jet bombers. Though British air power is weak quantitatively 
today and dependent chiefly upon U.S. F-86 jet fighters and U.S. B-29 bom')ers, 
the future qualitative picture is bright. Thus to our own strength in Europe 
must be added the strength of NATO. Despite what some people in this country 
say, NATO is a great asset to the free world and the industrial Ol!.tpui: of Western 
Europe, particularly, that of the Ruhr is tremendously important. The divisions, 
fleets and air forces of the thirteen countries in the NATC alliance, are not to be 
taken lightly. Exclusive of five United States divisions, the original NATO today 
can put into the field 49 divisions in Western Europe plus 10 small ones in Greece; 
22 large ones in Turkey and 33 in Yugoslavia. This compares favorably with 
eaotern European satellite strength of approximately 80 divisions. Our allies 
also opt:l::::-ate over 4, 000 aircraft and more than l, 000 antisubmarine and coastal 
naval vessels. In cont:-ast in the Pacific there are now 20 South Korean divisions. 
There are now the beginning of six arme<.l divisions in Japan; Chiang Kai - shek has 
21 d:.visions on Formosa and in Indo-China t!,e French have the equivalent to ten 
divisions and in Malaya the British have 2 - 3. There are other units all over 
Asia and the Pacific but even here the back-bone of strength is America. Cn the 
other hand, the Chinese Communist Army is estimated at 4 million. In addition 
in other Asiatic countries there are fc.!"ther forces of guerrillas who are supported 
and kept in the fight by supplies from Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe. 
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This, then, is where we stand today -- considerably better off, in a 
military sense, than where we stood two and a half years ago, but by no means 
secure. In some ways we have gained by time; in some ways we have lost. We 
are stronger in conventional arms vis - a-vis Soviet Russia than we were, and we 
have probably gained relatively in atomic weapons , t~ough this relative gain 
cannot continue . 
Western Europe is no longer defenseless; the delys of a. Russian 
blitzkrieg and pushover are gone . Yugoslavia has th:!"own her lot in with the West 
in Europe . Our strength is now sufficient to force Russian re-enforcement and 
thus to give us wa.rn;ag of any attar 
Vfe are no longe r in the dire danger in Korea that we were in 1950; and 
t~e French -- faced in 1950 with the loss of the whole Red River valley in Indo-
China -- ce:!"tainly are better off today, having gained some advantages in the war 
of attrition in the past two years. In the Philippines, Malaya , and Burma, the 
Communist armed struggle has definitely lost st:i:'ength. 
Cur ready military strength is considcr:!.ble, and our tremendous 
military potential can be far more quickly realized than two years ago. 
But to offset thes e gains is the fact that Communist China has been 
strengthened, rather than weal~encd, by the Korean war. This vast As~_atic power 
seems to be more sol idly under control of its totalitaria.n leadership than it was 
three yea::::-s ago , and cer tainly it has made amazing strides in the development 
of modern mili tary power -- particularly in the air (there are now 2, 500 to 3, 000 
ChineJe planes , furnished by Russia) . Thus the Chinese Red Army's weaknesses 
l 
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in air power, antiaircraft, artillc ry, communications, and mobility of supply 
have been to a large extent (though not, of course, completely) r emedied, and we 
may be witnessing in the Orient a historic phenomenon of tremendous importance 
to our time -- the emereence of China from feudalism into a modern state. 
There is another debit in the balance sheet, ~aused (but only partially) 
by the frustration of Korea. It is a lack of drive and a declining sense of urgency 
-- a sometimes apathetic morale -- and the national frictions c:.nd differences 
that weaken the anti-Communist coalition. 
Where , then, do we go from here -- with crisis not ended but 
compounded? 
/ At this time a precise answer is not pes sible. The first Eisenl:ower 
defense ~.:'ld foreign aid budget was undoubtedly indicative of a trend to "stretch 
out•• ana .... H. o&ck", and yet to maintain a strong military posture. But no firm 
idea of where we are going -- or how fast -- was possible until: (a) the four new 
membe~s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had •• s} aken down'' in their duties and 
functioned as a team; (b} a complete review of s::z-ategic plans and levels of armed 
strength has been made by the new Chiefs of Staff; (c) the Eisenhower defense 
budget for ~he 1955 fiscal yea"!: has been prepared; and (d) there is further develop-
ment of the meaning of recent internal events in Russia and clarificatior. of the 
Comm\!Ilists ' "peace" gestures. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs have come 
up with a "new look" which no one, as yet, fully understands except that it 
increases ai:· power, places major reliance 01, the Strategic Air Command -- the 
"massive retaliatory power" aspect- - and reduces the present strength of the 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
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There is, however, no doubt that Congress and much of the Republican 
Party are in an eco::1omy mood; that the form of economic iso lation! sm which 
expresses itself in high tariff barric4's and in shar? reductions in foreign aid is 
gaining strength; and that, while air power still has a great political and popular 
appeal, many Congresamen believe there is m~:c:1 wast~ c:.nd "fat" in the defense 
badget. Unless the world crisis sharpens, the arm~d services and especially 
the fore5gn a:d ~4'ogram are certainly in for a perbd of ::!ollar ::-etrenchment. 
The 1954 de!cnse budget, prep~.ted by the Truman Administ~ation but 
hastily revised by Secre~r i of Defense ~Vilson and President E~.senhowe::-, 
showed the trend clearly. Expenditures during the next fiscal year will not be 
greatly reduced because of prior contracts and a balance on th~ books o: l:-~1lions 
o! dollars of authol'ized funds which have nul yet been obli&ated or spent. 
P.:owever, a deep cut of more than $5 billion was applied to ~he T::-um..._n 
armed for:::es ~ppropriation request for fiscal 1954 and the Eisenhower budget for 
1955 • .Such c·_;~.":s w~~l tcsult in an actual redncti.on of existing operating units; it 
w5.11 not cut, this year, into bone or muscle or sir.ew; but it wia rnec.n a reduction 
;n d~:ive::ies of cdrcraft and other items in future years. Furt'Ge:w:-more, it almost 
ce ·:;d:1~y irnplieq abc:.ndonm3nt of the 143-g::o~~p proeram of the Air Force. 
T:'e immediate results a"e that :he servi=e~:!f! J:;.-:f.:/!f;,}::;:,..·r-
boi:!- :n numbers of men in uniform ar.d in m .. mbc:os of ~i.vi!ian employees; that 
som-::: O!'de:~s fo:.: 11ew eq;;ipr.,ent will not be ri.aced; and a~so ~ha.t som~ existing 
o:-ce:&.·s will be eH:1er ca!lcelled, cut bc:.ck, or st::etcned out. 
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The l o ng -te r m effects arc mor e i mpo rtant. The cut seems to mean 
that the expansion and growth of the armed forces -- though not their mode r niza-
tion -- is to be halted bel o w presen t levels and under the "plateau of :.trength" 
which had been the goal of the Truman Administra ~ion . 
The Truman expansion p r ogram , hastily invoked after the Korean war, 
had as its goals an Army of 2.1 active divisions (plus 18 r egimenta l combat teams, 
etc.), a Navy of more than 1, 200 active ope r ating vessels and some 15, 000 
modern aircraft (including Marine a irc\·a!t), a Marine Corps of 3 didsiona and 
3 alr wings, and an Air Fo:rce vf 143 groups, most of thetn equipped with mode rn 
postwar aircraft to~ ~:otal of a bout 21, 000 planes. The target date for these goals 
was o riginally mid-1954; this was stretched out under President Tt uman to 
1955-56 . 
When President Eisenhower took office , the Army was shy only one of 
ito 21 divioions, thoug!1 many of its units were incomplete; and the l'Tavy was on 
the whole in good shape , though it badly ne t ded new j ets for its carriers and a 
program of shipbuilding and ship conversion. Thus the Army and Navy had almos 
reache d the levels o f their numerical expansion, though the ir corresponding 
modernization program was but half completed. 
The Air Fo rce, however, had r eac-hed only 110 groups on its way to the 
1~3 - g>.·oup goal , altho ugh S('c r etary of Defense Wilson stated in Indianapolis , on 
Decembe~· 7, 1953, that h e will ask Congress in fiscal year 1955 fo r funds tv build 
toward a 137 - group Air Force by mid- 1956 o r 1957. 11or eove r, o nly about 85 
of these were fully ope rational, and the re was still a high percentage of 
ob solescent \/orld \'lar II type aircraft. 
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In sum, the new y....,~rarr. sPems to mean - - 8 ur.je(;~ tv thE:> qualifying 
factors previously mentioned -- tAAt the Army will stabilize at a strength of .i,; 
4-~~ 
divisions (many under str-ength}; the Navy" wHl b-e reduced somewhat in size; and 
the Air Force will stabilize at something like i.37 groups. 
Also, the new "plateau of strength" - - lowe!" than the old -- will 
probably be reached (insofar as complete modernization of the servi ces is con-
cerned} somewhat later than the previous 1955-56 d~adline. 
The revised goals, plus the slowdown in the NATO prog::-am, may 
ultimately result in somewhat greater combat effectiveness of the active units 
even though t~e total strength will be less. Cn balance, the calculated military 
risk has been some'l.vhat increased, for there has been no change in our estimate 
of Russian military capabilities save the obvious struggle for power now going on 
in the Kremlin. 
* * * * * * * 
* * * 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 15, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
